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INTRODUCTION
Few things are as controversial as government interference with
private property interests.' In our society, property ownership has
long been a part of obtaining economic success and is therefore seen
as desirable. However, it is well established that all levels of
government have the right to restrict land uses and can even acquire
the land in fee through the power of eminent domain.2 An important
issue that does not receive enough attention is the amount of
* Copyright © 2007 by Avery Emison Carson.
1. See Dan Berman, Reg-takings Measures Fail To Hitch Ride on Anti-Kelo
Bandwagon, GREENWIRE, Dec. 4, 2006 (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
Heather Kays, War Over Land, HERALD NEWS (New Jersey), Nov. 16, 2006, available at
http://www.northjersey.com/page.php?qstr=eXJpcnk3ZjcxN2Y3dnFIZUVFeXkzJmZnYm
VsN2Y3dnFIZUVFeXk3MDIxNzE5; Rick Werhi, Letter to the Editor, Time To Bring
Wyoming's Eminent Domain Law into the 21st Century, WYO. TRIB.-EAGLE, Jan. 22,
2007, at A8.
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
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compensation to which landowners are entitled when the government
takes land in fee or restricts uses of the land.'
In order to achieve the highest level of compensation for their
clients, it is important for practitioners negotiating compensation to
be creative in advancing possible uses of the land. Developments in
environmental regulation have presented opportunities to value land
in nontraditional ways.4 For some landowners, dedicating their land
to a conservation use may bring the best price for the land.5 For
example, a landowner can place a conservation easement on her land6
or convert the land into a wetland. 7 The push for market-based
environmental regulations has created markets which have increased
the amount that landowners can be compensated for dedicating their
land to a conservation use.8  Open markets currently exist for
wetlands and endangered species credits, and additional possibilities
are on the horizon.9
In Part I, this Comment will outline the basics of eminent domain
and regulatory takings and explain the standards courts consider
when compensating landowners whose property has been taken.
Specifically, this Comment will establish that landowners must
receive "just compensation" under the Constitution, that Olson v.
United States'" is the standard for just compensation, and that
conservation uses are a factor that courts should consider under the
Olson standard. In Part II, this Comment will survey cases in which
litigators have sought to value property based on its possible
3. Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for
Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 677, 678 (2005).
4. See Royal C. Gardner, Banking on Entrepreneurs: Wetlands, Mitigation Banking,
and Takings, 81 IOWA L. REV. 527, 529 (1996) (examining traditional notions of property
value and explaining that wetlands mitigation banking may provide society with an
opportunity to place value on land that is purposefully left in its natural state, as opposed
to traditional notions that land is only valuable when it is used for economic production).
5. For the purposes of this Comment, a conservation use is a use which permanently
converts a piece of land to a use that improves environmental conditions on the land.
6. See John P. McDermott, 'An Everlasting Legacy': Conservation Groups Help
Property Owners Protect Their Land, POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Jan. 16, 2005,
at D1.
7. Gardner, supra note 4, at 551.
8. See infra Part I.C.
9. JESSICA WILKINSON & JARED THOMPSON, ENVTL. LAW INST., 2005 STATUS
REPORT ON COMPENSATORY MITIGATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2006), available at
http://www.elistore.org/reports%5Fdetail.asp?ID=11137&topic=Wetlands (charting the
growth in wetlands mitigation banking markets and explaining the total amount of credits
purchased as of 2005); see Dana Clark & David Downes, What Price Biodiversity?
Economic Incentives and Biodiversity Conservation in the United States, 11 J. ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 9, 51-56 (1996); infra Parts IV.A and IV.B.
10. 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
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conservation uses, showing that courts have been reluctant to
consider conservation uses when applying Olson. In Part III, this
Comment will outline recent changes in environmental law that are
creating environmental markets. Part IV of this Comment will
explore the current state of environmental markets and the need to
use markets to protect environmental resources. This Comment will
show that current environmental regulations have created a market
for wetland mitigation credits and that a market for endangered
species credits is evolving. Ultimately, this Comment concludes that
although precedent in this area sends mixed messages, some
conservation uses should be taken into account when compensating
landowners for a taking because such uses are a viable market for
which buyers are currently willing to pay.
I. EMINENT DOMAIN AND REGULATORY TAKINGS
The Federal Constitution gives the government the power of
eminent domain, or the right to take land from private owners in
order to fulfill public need.11 The framers inserted the power of
eminent domain directly into the Constitution, stating, "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation."12 The power of eminent domain allows governments
to acquire lands to build crucial infrastructure like schools, roads, and
military installations.13
In addition to the power to take land in fee, the government can
also place restrictions on land use which sometimes rise to the level of
a taking. As the government began to exercise the power to regulate
property uses, the law of regulatory takings developed.14 The power
to regulate property uses is primarily exercised in zoning and
environmental protection laws.15 Regulations restrict the uses that
property owners may make of their land. For instance, a landowner
11. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
12. Id.
13. For a more in-depth discussion of the scope of projects that are for public
purposes, see Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 480-84 (2005). See also Carolyn
A. Pearce, Recent Development, Forcing Urban Redevelopment To Proceed "Building by
Building": North Carolina's Flawed Policy Response to Kelo v. City of New London, 85
N.C. L. REV. 1784, 1789-90 (2007) (discussing North Carolina's response to Kelo).
14. See, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) ("[W]hile property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.").
15. For an example of an environmental regulation, see 33 C.F.R. § 322.1 (2006)
(restricting landowners from altering a navigable waterway without a permit). Zoning
laws are typically local ordinances. See, e.g., RALEIGH, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES
§§ 10-2001 to -2171 (2007).
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may not be permitted to open a mine or quarry in the middle of a
residential neighborhood. t6 Likewise, a farmer may not fill a portion
of his wetland property without first obtaining a permit. t7 Although
government entities can usually enforce these restrictions without
triggering a takings case, sometimes the regulations cause the land to
be effectively worthless on the market. 8 In those situations, courts
rule that a regulatory taking has occurred and the landowner must be
compensated.19
A. Just Compensation
Although the government has the power to take private
property, the Constitution provides that it must give the landowner
just compensation if it does so.2" In eminent domain, this is a fairly
simple concept: the government takes private land in fee in exchange
for a payment to the owner in every case.2' In regulatory takings
cases, however, the analysis is more complex, as courts compare the
value of the land before the regulation with the value of the land after
the regulation.2" Only if the value of the regulated land has been
reduced to practically zero is the owner entitled to compensation.23
Once a court establishes that a taking has occurred, through
either eminent domain or a regulatory taking, the analysis of
compensation is the same. The measure of just compensation is the
fair market value of the land. 4 Landowners are entitled to an
assessment of fair market value by either a commission of
adjudicators, a single judge, or a jury trial, and both parties to the
16. RALEIGH, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 10-2071 (2007), available at
http://www.raleighnc.gov/publications/Planning/City CodeExcerpts/PermittedUsesTab
leFull.pdf (page 15).
17. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000); 33 C.F.R. § 320.1(b)(5) (2006).
18. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978)
(stating that the landowner would be entitled to relief if the regulation prevents the
property from being "economically viable").
19. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1027 (1992) ("Where the State seeks
to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may
resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's
estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.").
20. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21. Campbell v. United States, 266 U.S. 368, 370-71 (1924).
22. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987).
23. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-28. While this statement is a gross oversimplification of
the case-by-case inquiries that courts undertake in regulatory takings analysis, an
examination of the amount of reduction in value which courts consider a taking is outside
the scope of this Comment.
24. Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934). Fair market value is the amount
that a willing buyer would pay a willing seller on the day the land is taken. Id. at 257.
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proceeding usually rely on expert appraisers. 21 Regulatory takings
also occur in the context of permit applications and denials. Courts
are to compare the value of the land before and after the permit
denial to determine whether a taking has occurred.26
B. The Olson Test and "Highest and Best Use"
When determining just compensation, it may seem intuitive to
look at the uses that the landowner has made of the land. However,
this is not the standard. Appraisers are allowed to value land at the
"highest and best use," which is the use that will be most profitable to
the landowner.27  The highest and best use standard makes logical
sense because a willing buyer would consider possible uses and pay a
higher price for land that could be put to a more profitable use.28 For
instance, a piece of farmland that is suitable for subdivision will be
valued as a subdivision, even if the current landowner has no plans to
subdivide.
The standard for determining whether a possible use will be
considered in an appraisal was laid out in Olson v. United States.29
According to Olson, courts are to decide whether the proposed use
could be applied in the reasonably near future.3" Of course, if the
hypothetical piece of farmland mentioned in the previous paragraph
were in a floodplain or in a remote area, then subdividing would not
be a use that could be applied in the reasonably near future. Courts
also phrase this standard by stating that the proposed use cannot be
25. 1A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 4.104-.105 (3d ed.
2007) [hereinafter NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN 2007]; 7 JULIUS L. SACKMAN,
NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § G3.08 (3d ed. 2006) [hereinafter NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN 2006].
26. See infra note 65. See generally Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 CI.
Ct. 153 (1990) (concluding that a permit denial constituted a taking and awarding just
compensation by comparing the fair market value of the property before the taking with
the fair market value after the taking).
27. 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN 2006, supra note 25, § 13.01[8]; see also Olson,
292 U.S. at 255 (holding that the "highest and most profitable use for which the property is
adaptable ... in the reasonably near future is to be considered"). Of course, the land may
be suitable for several uses under the Olson standard; compensation is awarded on the
most profitable of the possible uses. Id. at 255.
28. Olson, 292 U.S. at 255.
29. 292 U.S. 246 (1934).
30. Id. at 255. The standard is flexible in that even though land may not be
immediately adjacent to already-developed land or may not be previously zoned for a
particular use, courts may still consider that use if it is reasonable to believe that
development will stretch into the countryside or that future owners would be able to
obtain the permits necessary to develop that land.
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too speculative.31 However, it is important to note that there is
another use for the term "speculative." In the second use of the term,
real estate buyers purchase land as an investment with the
expectation that the land's value will increase.32
C. Practical Applications
As a first instinct, practitioners often try to value land at the most
intensive commercial use feasible.33 Typically, appraisers will be
asked to value the land as if it were subdivided for residential use or,
depending on the site, industrial use. This is understandable because
our culture tends to see development as an economic way forward.34
Therefore, litigation typically centers on whether an undeveloped
piece of property is suitable for a more developed use.35 Practitioners
should be careful, however, to evaluate all the possible methods of
valuing the property in order to achieve the highest level of
compensation possible for their clients. Due to relatively recent
developments in environmental law, appraising a tract of land based
on its conservation uses may result in a higher land value and,
therefore, a larger payment to the client whose land the government
is taking.36
The term "conservation uses" broadly refers to all environmental
credits and payments that landowners can receive for taking certain
actions that benefit the natural environment. Landowners can make
arrangements with regulatory agencies, both state and federal, to
preserve their land or to enhance the land to attract certain kinds of
31. See, e.g., United States v. 320.0 Acres of Land, 605 F.2d 762, 814 (5th Cir. 1979);
United States v. 1291.83 Acres of Land, 411 F.2d 1081, 1084 (6th Cir. 1969).
32. Real estate entrepreneurs often buy land and hold it for future use. This is called
"buying speculatively." Such entrepreneurs represent a willing hypothetical buyer who
will buy land as an investment and hold it until the value increases. The price that the
entrepreneur would pay for the land is the fair market value at the time and is not a
"speculative" use under the Olson standard because there is a current willing buyer. Fla.
Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (quoting Fla. Rock
Indus. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). In sum, although the term
"speculative" can be confusing, the test for considering a highest and best use is whether
there is a current hypothetical willing buyer, and the proper valuation is what that buyer
would pay at the time of the taking. Olson, 292 U.S. at 255.
33. Interview with F. Bryan Brice, Jr., Attorney-at-Law, in Raleigh, N.C. (Jan. 26,
2007).
34. Gardner, supra note 4, at 529.
35. See, e.g., Bowles v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 37, 40 (1994); Formanek v. United
States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 334 (1992); Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 312 (1991);
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 154 (1990).
36. See infra Part IV.A.
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plants or wildlife that are environmentally beneficial.37 Many times
the regulatory agency arranges for the landowner to sell a "credit" to
a regulated entity in exchange for the preservation or enhancement
work.38
At times, conservation uses are more valuable than developing
the land. For example, International Paper Corporation, a timber
company, has discovered that preserving land for hunting is
profitable.39 The southeastern division of the corporation now earns
twenty-five percent of its profits from recreational uses of its land.4"
The company uses a 16,000 acre tract in Georgia to research, among
other things, ways to increase wildlife on its timber holdings.41 In fact,
the area is so successful in protecting wildlife that the company is now
able to produce and sell Endangered Species Act ("ESA")42 credits
for red-cockaded woodpeckers.43
Similarly, the Lyme Timber Company discovered that merging
conservation uses with traditional timber industry activities increases
profits.' Likewise, many individuals are finding that they can gain
economically by placing a conservation easement on their land.45 An
investment group in Charleston, South Carolina was able to purchase
a 600 acre tract, develop only forty of the acres, and commit the rest
to conservation.46 Using this technique, the investors outbid a major
developer who would have developed the land much more
intensively.47
37. See Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation
Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. 58,605, 58,607 (Nov. 28, 1995) (outlining the concept of and policy
reasons for mitigation banks).
38. Id. A credit is the legal entitlement to create a certain unit of pollution. See id.
39. See Michael Parrish, Making It Pay To Conserve, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1989, at Al
(outlining how the company now keeps some of its land in a natural state in order to
promote wildlife).
40. Raymond Rasker, Michael V. Martin & Rebecca L. Johnson, Economics: Theory
Versus Practice in Wildlife Management, 6 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 338, 340 (1992).
41. Terry L. Anderson & Donald R. Leal, Nature's Entrepreneurs, THE FREEMAN,
Nov. 1998, at 648, available at http://www.fee.org/publications/the-freeman/article.asp?aid
=3689.
42. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000).
43. Environmental Defense, Red-Cockaded Woodpecker Conservation Bank,
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/article.cfm?contentid=2664 (last visited Nov. 7,
2007).
44. See The Lyme Timber Company, http://www.lymetimber.com/Forestlandl.html
(last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
45. See McDermott, supra note 6.
46. Id.
47. Id. Of course, conservation uses will not be the best economic use of a piece of
property every time. Whether or not the land could make a profit, or the most profit,
from a conservation use is a highly fact-intensive inquiry. Not all land is eligible for
[Vol. 86
2007] CONSERVATION USES AND TAKINGS LAW 281
In the current world of commerce, buyers and sellers are valuing
land with conservation uses in mind. Can takings law also value land
in this way? As we will see, courts have previously treated valuation
of land for conservation uses inconsistently and with suspicion.
II. CASE LAW SENDS MIXED MESSAGES
From an advocacy standpoint, government entities face a double-
edged sword when deciding whether or not to argue that conservation
uses are a possible highest and best use. When analyzing case law, it
is important to keep in mind that the same entity can find itself on
both sides of the argument depending on the type of takings case it is
litigating. If a parcel of land were more valuable for a conservation
use than commercial development, and if courts allowed such a
valuation as the highest and best use, then the landscape of takings
law might change significantly. First, the government would have to
pay more in certain eminent domain cases.48 This might direct the
government to take fewer lands with potential for conservation uses.
Second, the government would win more often in regulatory takings
cases.49 Currently, a court would likely view a permit denial to fill a
wetland as an action that takes all value from the land." Yet, if a
court were willing to recognize that land has a remaining value for
conservation uses, such permit denials would not take all of the legal
value from the land.5" Thus, a regulatory taking would not occur in
such cases, and the government would not have to compensate the
landowner.
2
At this point, the government has not adopted a stance on the
viability of conservation uses, and it appears that government
attorneys are free to advance whichever argument best suits their case
at the time. In Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States53 and
Formanek v. United States,54 two regulatory takings cases, the
conversion to a wetland or has an endangered species on it. See infra Part IV. What is
important is that practitioners and courts at least consider the possibility that the highest
and best use of the land may be a conservation use.
48. See 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN 2006, supra note 25, § 13.01[8].
49. See Gardner, supra note 4, at 587.
50. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
51. See Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 335 (1992) (holding that if land has
remaining legal value following a permit denial, a regulatory taking has not occurred
(quoting Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1986))).
52. Id.
53. 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990).
54. 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992).
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government argued that conservation was the highest and best use.55
In United States v. 7.92 Acres of Land,56 an eminent domain case, the
government argued that conservation was highest and best57 because,
for that particular piece of land, conservation uses were the least
valuable use of the land. In Ciampitti v. United States,58 the
government missed an opportunity to argue that conservation uses
were a highest and best use and conceded that the land in question
was worthless as a wetland.59 In Washington Metropolitan Area
Transit Authority v. United States,' the government argued that
conservation was not the highest and best use61 because the case
involved a taking by eminent domain, and the conservation use of the
land was the most valuable use. In that case, the court acknowledged
that the government often adopts different viewpoints on
conservation use as a highest and best use, depending on which is the
best argument for the government at the time.62
While the government as a litigant has adopted various stances
on conservation uses, courts have largely been consistent in finding
that conservation uses are not a highest and best use. Loveladies is
perhaps the best example. In that case, Loveladies Corporation sued
for compensation under a regulatory takings theory.63 While the
government argued that conservation was the highest and best use,
the court ruled against the government.' The Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps of Engineers" or "Corps") had denied Loveladies'
request for a permit to fill its wetlands, thereby precluding any
development of the land.65 The government argued that although the
land value had been reduced, the land still had value as a site suitable
55. Id. at 339; Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. at 158.
56. 769 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1985).
57. Id. at 12.
58. 22 Cl. Ct. 310 (1991).
59. Id. at 317.
60. 54 Fed. Cl. 20 (2002).
61. Id. at 33.
62. Id. at 34 n.20 (noting that "in many of the cases, defendant or one of its agencies
was the one arguing in favor of recreation or conservation use").
63. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 154 (1990).
64. Id. at 158.
65. Id. at 154. Section 404 of the Clean Water Act charges the Corps of Engineers
with the responsibility of regulating discharges of dredged or fill material into navigable
waterways. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000). Landowners must obtain a permit
before they are allowed to fill or destroy wetlands. Id. Permit denials frequently result in
a claim of regulatory taking by the landowner. See, e.g., Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl.
Ct. 332, 334 (1992); Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 316 (1991); Loveladies, 21
Cl. Ct. at 154 (all cases where the lawsuit for compensation was filed after a permit
denial).
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for conversion into a wetlands mitigation area.' According to the
government, the landowner could then have sold credits to those who
needed to mitigate the wetlands that they were permitted to destroy.67
The court flatly rejected the argument, stating:
There is no evidence that the alternative uses proposed by [the
government] ... would have met the standard of a reasonable
probability for adaptability and demand set forth in Olson.
Moreover, even if the court were to accept defendant's
unsupported contentions that the property could be adapted for
use for hunting, agriculture, as a mitigation site, or a marina,
that would not establish a market for that use.68
This ruling was made in spite of testimony by Corps of
Engineers' officers and developers, as well as documentary evidence
that the Corps frequently requires developers to pay others for
mitigation.69 The logic behind the court's decision was that despite
these requirements, there was no market for mitigation and,
therefore, the use was too remote to meet the Olson test.7 ' Thus, the
case stands for the premise that there is no market for wetlands
mitigation banking. While this may have been true in 1990 when the
U.S. Claims Court decided the case, such a finding may no longer be
accurate.7'
In 7.92 Acres of Land, the First Circuit was also skeptical that
conservation uses could be a highest and best use.72 In this case, the
landowner appealed a commission ruling in an eminent domain
proceeding that awarded the landowner $2,000 for her land.73 The
government argued that conservation was the highest and best use
because the land was not suitable for development.74  The
government made its argument in an attempt to reduce the appraisal
value of the land and thus pay less for it.75 The landowner, however,
66. Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. at 159.
67. Id.; see also infra Part IV.A (outlining market for undeveloped wetlands through
system of wetlands mitigation banking).
68. Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. at 159.
69. Id. This testimony was offered as evidence that a market does exist for mitigation.
See id.
70. Id.
71. See infra Part IV.
72. United States v. 7.92 Acres of Land, 769 F.2d 4, 12 (1st Cir. 1985).
73. Id. at 6.
74. Id. at 12.
75. See id.
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argued that the highest and best use was development. 6 The court
sided with the government and affirmed the commission's decision,
awarding the landowner $2,000; nevertheless, it noted that the
commission did not believe that there was a conservation market for
the land. 7
The inconsistency in the ruling is apparent under the Olson
standard.78 The court could not believe that the fair market value of
the land, based on conservation, was $2,000 and that a market for
conservation did not exist. If no market exists for use of the land,
then, under Olson, it is inappropriate to value that land based on such
a use because there is no fair market value without a market.79 The
bottom line is that the court dismissed the idea of conservation as a
viable market in this case as well.
In Formanek, the U.S. Claims Court applied Loveladies and
affirmed that courts do not view conservation uses as a highest and
best use.8" In 1960, Ray Formanek and his wife purchased property,
consisting of 100 acres of highly sensitive wetlands, for approximately
$18,000.81 In 1981, the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources
offered to purchase the property for $590,000.82 Later, these
negotiations fell through,83 although at trial Mr. Formanek's appraiser
admitted that the land was currently worth $490,000 as a conservation
property. 4  In 1985, the plaintiffs applied for a permit to fill the
wetlands but were denied, and the litigation ensued.85 The court
found that even though the landowner had received two specific
offers for his property from conservation interests, the value of the
76. Id. at 10, 12. Interestingly, the government attempted to establish that the land
could not be valued as a developable property because it was restricted by wetlands laws,
among other reasons. Id. at 12.
77. Id. at 12. 7.92 Acres of Land was decided in 1985 before most environmental
markets had developed, and therefore developed land was likely much more valuable than
any conservation use. See infra Part IV.
78. See supra Part I.B.
79. See 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN 2006, supra note 25, § 13.01[9]. Courts
sometimes do find that a piece of land does not have fair market value and therefore use
either a replacement cost approach (awarding the cost to the particular landowner of
purchasing another like piece of property) or an income-producing approach (awarding
the profit normally produced by the land). Id. While it is possible that the court in 7.92
Acres of Land employed one of these alternate approaches, the court never explicitly
stated that it chose to do so.
80. Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 333, 340 (1992).
81. Id. at 333.
82. Id. at 334.
83. ld.
84. Id. at 340.
85. Id. at 334.
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land had been so greatly reduced by a wetland permit denial that the
denial constituted a taking. 6
What is significant about Formanek is that the court knew of two
offers to purchase the land for a conservation use at substantial
prices," and yet deemed the after-taking value of the land to be
$112,000. 88 The court acknowledged that " 'if there is found to exist a
solid and adequate fair market value ... which [plaintiffs] could have
obtained from others for that property, that would be a sufficient
remaining use of the property to forestall a determination that a
taking had occurred ...... "89 The court's language indicates that,
while the court was aware that finding another profitable use of the
land would mean that the permit denial was not a taking, the court
was unwilling to view the conservationists' offers as a viable valuation
of the land.90 Thus, the underlying assumption was that conservation
uses are not an appropriate method of appraising land.91 Again, at
the time, the court may have been correct in its assumption. Under
current circumstances, however, the court would have been incorrect.
Ciampitti, another case involving a regulatory taking of wetlands,
demonstrates that practitioners can miss important opportunities to
consider conservation use values. In this case, both the government
and Ciampitti agreed, in the court's words, that "[t]he wetlands area
has only nominal value and is fundamentally commercially
unmarketable.""g The court could not look beyond the undisputed
evidence. While in other cases practitioners were making the
86. Id. at 341.
87. Formanek v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 785, 797 (1989) (noting in an earlier
interlocutory appeal from summary judgment that in addition to the $590,000 offer from
the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources, the plaintiffs also received another offer
from the Nature Conservancy for an unspecified amount).
88. Formanek, 26 Cl. Ct. at 340. The court found the before-taking value of the land
at the time of taking to be $933,921. Id.
89. Id. at 335 (quoting Fla. Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 903 (Fed.
Cir. 1986)).
90. The value of the land was still reduced by half. However, courts have consistently
ruled that the government does not have to pay for regulations which cause a "mere
diminution" in value. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153, 160 (1990)
(citing Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,413 (1922)). Takings are only deemed to have
occurred when the value is severely influenced. Id. The jurisprudence that draws the line
between mere diminution and severe interference is complex and requires case-specific
determinations. See Formanek, 26 Cl. Ct. at 335 ("[T]he court must make ad hoc, factual
inquiries into the circumstances of each particular case." (citation omitted)).
91. See Formanek, 18 Cl. Ct. at 789 ("This court adopts the view presented by
Loveladies Harbor that an offer to purchase made by a conservation group which would
maintain the property in its natural state is not a speculative, commercial, or recreational
use which would refute plaintiffs' taking claim as a matter of law.").
92. Ciampitti v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 310, 317 (1991).
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argument for including conservation uses,93 the government attorneys
here missed an important chance.
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims signaled a possible departure
from former attitudes about conservation uses in Washington
Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, where the government sought to
use eminent domain to take land which Washington Metro had
formerly used as a suburban rail line.94 The plaintiffs set forth a
unique argument that the highest and best use of the land was for an
unbroken hiking and biking trail.95 The court found that there was a
viable market for hiking and biking trails and noted that the Olson
approach is flexible enough for the court to consider all possible uses
of the land.96 The court also noted that the government has often
argued that conservation uses should be counted as a potential
highest and best use, such as in Loveladies and 7.92 Acres of Land.97
The ruling may signal a new era in which courts are willing to accept
conservation uses as a highest and best use; because similar cases
have not followed, however, it is not safe to assume that this was a
broad ruling in favor of conservation uses.
The above cases demonstrate that, for the most part, courts have
adopted the view that conservation uses should not be taken into
account when valuing land in either eminent domain or regulatory
takings cases. Only in some limited circumstances have courts used
conservation values as an indicator of fair market value.98 What is
unanswered is whether courts would generally accept valuation for
conservation uses as an acceptable appraisal method if those courts
understood that conservation uses constitute a viable market.99
Assuming that the Olson standard still holds, this Comment will
explore whether various conservation uses constitute a viable market
under the standard. In other words, are conservation uses reasonably
possible uses which are not too speculative?"°°
93. See Formanek, 26 CI. Ct. at 334; Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. at 158.
94. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. United States, 54 Fed. C1. 20, 21 (2002).
95. Id. at 28.
96. Id. at 32-33; see also supra Part I.B.
97. Id. at 34 n.20 ("[I]n many of these cases, [the United States] or one of its agencies
was the one arguing in favor of a recreation or conservation use." (citing Loveladies, 21 Cl.
Ct. at 159; United States v. 7.92 Acres of Land, 769 F.2d 4, 12 (1st Cir. 1985))).
98. See Wash. Metro., 54 Fed. Cl. at 32-33.
99. This idea was first explored by Royal C. Gardner in Banking on Entrepreneurs:
Wetlands, Mitigation Bankings, and Takings, supra note 4. At the time, Professor Gardner
concluded that wetlands mitigation banking had not yet emerged as a sufficient way to
value land. Id. at 577.
100. See id.
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III. HISTORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS
Environmental regulations have been the driving force behind
the creation of conservation markets.101 While most environmental
regulations began as strict government rules,31° many regulatory
schemes have at least partially integrated market-based systems,
which seek to use market incentives to encourage polluters to comply
with the law.103
Environmental laws initially came in the form of command and
control regulations."° Under these schemes, the government would
set a standard and command industry to follow.105 While command
and control regulations have provided great environmental gains for
the United States,0 6 these systems can be economically and
environmentally inefficient.10 7  Because command and control
regulations require two different firms, emitting the same pollutant,
to reduce emissions to the same level, they disregard the notion that
reducing emissions is more costly to some firms than to others.10 8 In
contrast, a market-based approach would allow the two firms to
bargain with one another to achieve the same total amount of
emission reduction at a lower overall price.0 9
101. See Parrish, supra note 39 (outlining a variety of economic incentives that have
been employed in United States environmental law).
102. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 88-98 (5th ed. 2006).
103. See Parrish, supra note 39.
104. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 102, at 90-91.
105. William W. Sapp, The Supply-Side and Demand-Side of Wetlands Mitigation
Banking, 74 OR. L. REV. 951, 957 (1995). For instance, federal air regulations specify that
new lime manufacturing plants cannot emit more than 0.3 kilograms of particulate matter,
a pollutant, per megagram of stone feed processed. 40 C.F.R. § 60.342 (2007).
106. William L. Andreen, Water Quality Today-Has the Clean Water Act Been a
Success?, 55 ALA. L. REV. 537, 542 (2004).
107. See id. at 539 ("[C]riticism often targets the [Clean Water] Act's reliance upon
technology-based standards because such a uniform approach to pollution control is said
to impose 'inordinate expense' and stifle 'innovation and investment that would benefit
both the environment and the economy.' " (quoting Richard B. Stewart, Economics,
Environment, and the Limits of Legal Control, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9 (1985))); see
also PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 102, at 136 (noting that economists are "harshly critical
of command-and-control regulations" due to their inefficiency).
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (2000) (authorizing the Environmental Protection
Agency to set up categories of sources and requiring each source to meet the same
emissions standards as other sources in its category). Sometimes, Firm A can reduce its
emissions at a lower cost per unit of emissions, perhaps because of a certain technology
that fits well with its plant. In command and control schemes, Firm B is required to
reduce its emissions to the same amount as Firm A, although it costs Firm B much more
per unit to achieve compliance. Sapp, supra note 105, at 958.
109. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 102, at 133. Firm A would reduce enough
pollution to cover both firms' requirements, and Firm B would compensate Firm A for
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A corollary to economic inefficiency is environmental
inefficiency. Regulated industries possess a great deal of political
clout, and if industries feel oppressed by command and control
regulations, then they are likely to fight back. 1° The result of political
fights is environmental inefficiencies.1 For instance, the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") alone has not been able to adequately regulate
nonpoint source pollution or provide comprehensive protection to
wetlands systems. 12  Furthermore, Congress has not regulated
development in a way that preserves biodiversity."3 With so much at
stake financially and ecologically, it is not surprising that compromise
over command and control regulations is hard to reach. Former U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") Administrator William
D. Ruckelshaus has stated, " 'We probably have taken the regulatory
system, what we call the command and control system, about as far as
we can take it .... If we're really going to make additional progress,
we have to figure out how to get the economic incentives in line with
our environmental goals.' "14 Therefore, the most environmentally
efficient way to approach environmental regulation may be to
compromise with the regulated community by allowing market-based
systems.1 5
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL MARKETS
Pressure to reform command and control regulations has caused
many types of environmental regulations to move towards a market-
based approach.1 6  For example, credits for emissions of sulfur
dioxide ("SO 2") are currently traded on the open market,'17 and the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service ("FWS") allows trading of habitat
doing so. The amount firm B would pay would be less than what it would cost the firm to
comply on its own. Id.
110. See Carl Pope, Executive Dir., Sierra Club, Taking the Initiative: Big Carbon
Fights Back (Jan. 16, 2007), http://www.sierraclub.org/carlpope/2007/01/big-carbon-fights-
back.asp.
111. Parrish, supra note 39 (" 'Where you can get the profit motive working,' said
Thomas Graff, a senior attorney of the Environmental Defense Fund, 'you will see a lot
more results more quickly than if you're simply trying to take something away from a
polluter.... You had a regulatory system that worked pretty well through the '70s, but, in
essence, a confrontationist approach breeds its own response.' ").
112. Andreen, supra note 106, at 543-44.
113. See Clark & Downes, supra note 9, at 33.
114. Parrish, supra note 39.
115. See Clark & Downes, supra note 9, at 15-16.
116. Id.
117. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 102, at 96.
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credits for sensitive species." 8  In addition, wetlands mitigation
banking allows developers to buy wetland credits in exchange for the
right to develop the wetlands they own." 9 Although not as easily
valuated, other programs such as conservation payments to farmers
for employing farming techniques that decrease erosion, and the
recent purchase of the Hudson Valley watershed by New York City,
also offer examples of landowners who received cash on the open
market after converting their land to conservation uses. 2°
SO 2 trading is a classic market-based regulation. An amendment
to the Clean Air Act passed during the George H.W. Bush
administration directs the EPA to set caps on SO 2 emissions across
the country.'2' Permits then issued to firms give the plants the right to
emit a certain number of tons of SO2 per year. 22  The permits will
likely be issued for less than the plants already emit, and so firms will
be compelled to either install pollution controls or purchase credits
from firms that reduce more than is required. 23 Plants that reduce
more than is required are then allowed to sell their credits to other
polluters. 24 Thus, individual firms will do what is most profitable for
themselves: either buy extra credits on the market or clean up and
sell excess credits to other firms.
118. PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION SERVICE AND THE UNITED
STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE AND THE
ASSOCIATION OF FISH AND WILDLIFE AGENCIES 1 (2007), http://www.fws.gov/
endangered/pdfs/CreditTradingMOU.pdf [hereinafter PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT].
The program has been implemented in at least one area. See Press Release, U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Serv. Endangered Species Program, First Lady Tours Fort Hood Recovery Credit
System Pilot Project (Aug. 24, 2007), http://www.fws.gov/endangered (discussing the
Army's purchase of credits to mitigate impacts it has on the golden-cheeked warbler).
The FWS began using trading programs in 2003. Guidance for the Establishment, Use and
Operation of Conservation Banks, 68 Fed. Reg. 24,753, 24,753 (May 8, 2003). FWS
reiterated its commitment in 2007 with an interagency agreement. PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENT, supra, at 1.
119. See Gardner, supra note 4, at 531.
120. New York City discovered that, by investing in watershed conservation, it could
provide pure drinking water to the city for $1.5 billion, a far cry from the estimated six to
eight billion dollar cost for a water purification plant. James Salzman, Creating Markets
for Ecosystem Services: Notes from the Field, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 870, 878-79 (2005).
121. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651-7651o (2000).
122. § 7651b(a).
123. § 7651b(b).
124. Id.; 40 C.F.R. pt. 73 (2006). According to the Chicago Climate Exchange Web
site, credits cost about $400 per twenty-five credits. Chicago Climate Futures Exchange,
http://www.ccfe.com/mktdataccfe/sfi.jsf (last visited Nov. 7, 2007). Professor Percival
claims that credits trade from $50 to $200 each. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 102, at 555.
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Of course, SO2 credits are not exactly relevant to eminent
domain because landowners cannot create credits to sell simply by
owning the land. However, such a system would be relevant if the
United States chooses to regulate greenhouse gases which cause
global climate change. Industry executives are already calling for a
system of credit trading for carbon that is similar to the SO2 system. 125
Under that scheme, landowners would be able to create carbon
credits to sell by planting additional trees on their land. 126 In fact, a
similar system already exists in Europe, and firms pay landowners
across the globe in order to offset their emissions. 27  As of this
writing, carbon offsets are trading in the three dollar range. 28
Greenhouse gas trading is already a viable market that will likely
continue to grow. 129  Land that is currently rural forestland and not
readily developable in the near future may have a highest and best
use as a carbon sequestration site. 30
A. Wetlands Mitigation Banking
Perhaps the best opportunity for courts to find a viable market
that would satisfy Olson is in wetlands mitigation banking. Wetlands
mitigation banking is a robust market, and wetlands are a vital part of
the environment that judges should seek to protect in the public
interest.
125. David Lazarus, Time for CEOs To Step Up, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 24, 2007, at C1.
126. Chicago Climate Exchange, CCX Offsets Program, http://www.chicagoclimatex
.com/content.jsf?id=23 (last visited Nov. 7, 2007). This particular program pays individuals
to plant trees and grass cover to reduce emissions and to capture and burn methane. This
is called carbon sequestration, which refers to the ability of trees to trap carbon as they
grow.
127. See European Commission Environment Directorate, http://ec.europa.eu/
environment/climat/emission.htm#brochure (last visited Nov. 7, 2007); see also The
Katoomba Group's Ecosystem Marketplace, Carbon Markets, http://ecosystemmarket
place.com/pages/marketwatch.overview.aggregate.php?market-id=12 (last visited Nov. 7,
2007) (showing the carbon markets of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme).
128. Chicago Climate Exchange, CCX CFI End of Day Summary, http://www.chicago
climatex.com/market/data/daily.jsf (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
129. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 102, at 1065. European Union leaders have
recently pursued an even more ambitious program of reductions that will likely result in a
greater trading volume. See id.
130. Rural land is just as subject to takings as is urban land. The government may need
such land for an interstate highway or a secluded military installation. For example, the
World War II Manhattan Project designated land in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, a remote area
of the state, to develop the atomic bomb. The government requisitioned enough land to
build a "secret city." See Oak Ridge National Laboratory, http://www.ornl.gov/info/
swords/swords.shtml (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
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1. Background
Section 404 of the CWA authorizes the Corps of Engineers to
protect wetlands by requiring a permit for anyone who wants to
"dredge[] or fill" wetlands on their property.'31 The Corps has a
policy of "no net loss," meaning that although some wetlands will
inevitably be lost to development, developers are responsible for
replacing the wetlands they destroy.3 2 The goal of the policy is to
stop loss of wetland acreage and eventually regain some of the
wetlands already lost.133  Developers were initially expected to
preserve or create additional wetlands on the same site as the
damaged wetlands.'34 However, these onsite wetlands often did not
serve to replace the functions of the damaged wetlands because
developers did not have the expertise to create wetlands."' Further,
this system of mitigation was economically inefficient because the
onsite land was often worth a great deal of money, while offsite areas
could be converted to wetlands for a lower price.
36
Regulators soon found an alternative to onsite mitigation called
wetlands mitigation banking. This system permits developers to pay a
landowner at a different site to preserve existing wetlands, enhance a
currently degraded wetland, or to create an entirely new wetland
area.'37 The Corps of Engineers determines, from the site to be
destroyed, how many credits of mitigation will be required. 138  The
131. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000). The Corps first prefers that landowners avoid or
minimize damage to wetlands on their property. After these possibilities have been
exhausted, mitigation is considered. Mathew H. Bonds & Jeffrey J. Pompe, Calculating
Wetland Mitigation Banking Credits: Adjusting for Wetland Function and Location, 43
NAT. RESOURCES J. 961, 962 (2003).
132. Gardner, supra note 4, at 534-35.
133. Id. at 534.
134. Bonds & Pompe, supra note 131, at 962.
135. See id.
136. See id.
137. Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks,
60 Fed. Reg. 58,605, 58,607 (Nov. 28, 1995); Bonds & Pompe, supra note 131, at 962-63;
Gardner, supra note 4, at 531. Mitigation through preservation of existing wetlands is
controversial. Although preserved natural wetlands often will be more functional than a
created wetland, it is not consistent with the "no net loss" policy to allow mitigation by
preservation. Gardner, supra note 4, at 553.
138. Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks,
60 Fed. Reg. at 58,612. This is not necessarily a one-to-one ratio. Created wetlands offsite
do not necessarily serve as high a function as natural wetlands, and so often regulators
require more wetlands to be created than are destroyed. See Gardner, supra note 4, at
552-55 for a discussion on how agencies calculate this ratio. See also Bonds & Pompe,
supra note 131, at 965-66 (stating that different parcels of wetlands should be valued
according to their functions and that regulators do so in practice by creating "trading
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Corps also determines how many credits a mitigation site can offer
for sale.139 Entrepreneurs can therefore create large-scale mitigation
banks for profit by buying regular land, converting it into wetland,
and then selling the credits to developers.' 4°
2. Why Mitigation Banks Are a Highest and Best Use Under Olson
A robust market for wetlands mitigation banking does currently
exist.1'4  Generally, there are two types of wetland mitigation banks:
purely entrepreneurial and in-lieu-fee. 142 Entrepreneurial banks are
run by private owners who buy land speculatively and then convert
the land into a wetland.43 Once the wetland has begun to perform
ecological functions-a determination made by the Corps of
Engineers-the credits that the bank has created can then be sold on
the open market.'" In contrast, in-lieu-fee programs are typically run
by the government.14  The government entity, usually the state, fixes
prices for different kinds of wetland credits, and developers pay into
the state fund in order to meet their mitigation requirements. 146 The
state is then charged with creating the offsetting wetland area.
ratios"). This is also consistent with the long-term policy of increasing the nation's total
wetland area. See Gardner, supra note 4, at 534.
139. Federal Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks,
60 Fed. Reg. at 58,612; Gardner, supra note 4, at 552-54.
140. See Gardner, supra note 4, at 551. In some cases, the developer is also the owner
of the mitigation bank. Id. State departments of transportation may follow this model.
See id.
141. See generally WILKINSON & THOMPSON, supra note 9 (describing the various
prices and systems for selling wetland mitigation credits).
142. See Bonds & Pompe, supra note 131, at 963. It may be overly simplistic to reduce
the regulatory options to a choice between private banks and state-run in-lieu-fee
programs. See WILKINSON & THOMPSON, supra note 9, for a more extensive explanation
of the different ways to achieve mitigation. See also Federal Guidance for the
Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. at 58,607
(establishing federal policy on the operation of entrepreneurial wetland mitigation banks);
FEDERAL GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF IN-LIEU-FEE ARRANGEMENTS FOR
COMPENSATORY MITIGATION UNDER SECTION 404 OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND
SECTION 10 OF THE RIVERS AND HARBORS ACT 1 (2000), http://www.epa.gov/owow/
wetlands/regs/inlieufee.pdf (clarifying federal policy on the operation of state-run in-lieu-
fee mitigation programs).
143. See Bonds & Pompe, supra note 131, at 963.
144. See Gardner, supra note 4, at 555-56; see also Federal Guidance for the
Establishment, Use and Operation of Mitigation Banks, 60 Fed. Reg. at 58,607
(establishing federal policy on the sale of credits by entrepreneurial banks).
145. WILKINSON & THOMPSON, supra note 9, at 14. In 2005, eighty-one percent were
run by the Corps of Engineers, fourteen percent were run by state agencies, and just under
five percent were run by local authorities. Id. at 16.
146. Id. at 14; see, e.g., North Carolina Ecosystem Enhancement Program,
http://www.nceep.net/pages/fee.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2007) (listing North Carolina's
prices for in-lieu-fee credits).
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The Environmental Law Institute ("ELI") periodically surveys
Corps of Engineers' offices to determine the kinds and amounts of
mitigation projects being operated.147 In 1992, circa Loveladies14 and
Formanek,'49 only forty-six wetland mitigation banks existed in the
United States, and none had sold out of credits. 5 ' In 2005, however,
there were 330 banks, and seventy-five banks had completely sold
out.151 Seventy percent of banks in 2005 had credits for sale on the
open market. 152  In addition, there were forty-two in-lieu-fee
programs.'53 By 2001, 42,000 acres of wetlands had been created for
the purpose of mitigation.'54
The market prices for mitigation credits demonstrate that
mitigation banking is a robust market. For instance, credits in Florida
have sold for as much as $45,000 per acre. 55 ELI's survey of open-
market banks showed a low of $3,000 per acre in the Baltimore
district and a high of $350,000 per acre in the Norfolk district.
56
Prices vary due to factors such as land costs and the type of mitigation
performed.157  For instance, North Carolina's in-lieu-fee program
breaks down payments according to the type of wetland that will be
147. WILKINSON & THOMPSON, supra note 9, at 1. Eighty-two percent of Corps of
Engineers Districts responded to the 2005 survey. Id.
148. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990).
149. Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992).
150. WILKINSON & THOMPSON, supra note 9, at 2.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 7. The other thirty percent were wetland banks created specifically for one
developer, with all of the credits from that bank going to offset the developer's project, or
were state-run banks which were partially used to offset government projects. Id.
153. Id. at 15.
154. Bonds & Pompe, supra note 131, at 963. There is some debate about the
appropriate way to go about creating credits. Some environmentalists agree that putting a
permanent conservation easement on an existing wetland should count as a creation of
credits. Others disagree, claiming that because such wetlands already existed, simply
preserving them does not offset the damage that the development is doing, and that a
more appropriate mitigation method is to create new wetlands or improve degraded
wetlands; this way, the increased wetland functions truly offset those lost in development.
However, currently existing wetlands often function better than manmade ones. The
bottom line is that some landowners of wetlands may be able to earn profit from the land
by placing a permanent easement on the land, while owners of land suitable for conversion
to wetland can definitely earn revenue this way. For a summary of this debate, see
Gardner, supra note 4, at 552-53.
155. Bonds & Pompe, supra note 131, at 976.
156. WILKINSON & THOMPSON, supra note 9, at 28. It should be noted that ELI could
not report accurately on this matter because some districts responded to the survey with
total prices, while others responded with a mitigation-plus-land-costs price. Id. Further,
only thirty-nine percent of districts responded with any information at all. Id.
157. Id. at 28.
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destroyed. 158 As of July 1, 2007, a credit for non-riparian wetland
costs $14,676 per acre, while a credit for riparian wetland costs
$29,351 per acre. 159 The Katoomba Group's Ecosystem Marketplace,
a web-based trading system, reports forty-seven open-market trades
since 2000 for a total of 7,967 credits and a market volume of
$289,659,866.16°
Wetlands mitigation banking, therefore, creates a market for
lands which can be converted to wetland and, in some cases, land
which is currently wetland.6  When facing a takings case,
practitioners should question whether the land is convertible and, if
so, what mitigation bankers are willing to pay for such land. This
conservation use is an appropriate and relevant highest and best use
under the Olson standard that can result in higher compensation for
some landowners. 62 Of course, in a regulatory takings case, the
opposite is true; if courts consider wetlands to be valuable for their
preservation credits, then the land would have remaining value which
would preclude the court from finding a taking.
163
The most important argument, however, is for the landowners
whose land is being taken. By arbitrarily denying a system of
valuation that may result in higher compensation for the landowner,
courts are denying those landowners their constitutional right to just
compensation, thereby violating due process.16
158. North Carolina Ecosystem Enhancement Program, http://www.nceep.net/pages/
fee.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2007).
159. Id. The difference in price might be attributed to the fact that riparian wetlands
border a waterway and may thus be considered more environmentally valuable than non-
riparian wetlands.
160. The Katoomba Group's Ecosystem Marketplace, Water Markets, http://ecosystem
marketplace.com/pages/marketwatch.overview.transaction.php?market-id= 4 (last visited
Nov. 7, 2007).
161. Gardner, supra note 4, at 563.
162. See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 254-55 (1934).
163. Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332, 335 (1992) (quoting Fla. Rock Indus.,
Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
164. Nichols on Eminent Domain states:
It has been held that even though the constitutional prohibition against the taking
of property without due process of law does not specify or regulate compensation,
just compensation, made or secured, is an essential element of due process of law
with respect to the taking of private property for a public use.
1A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN 2007, supra note 25, § 4.8.
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3. Public Policy Is Served by Ruling that Mitigation Banks Are a
Highest and Best Use
In addition to applying the Olson standard to conservation uses,
courts should also keep in mind the public policy concerns at stake. It
is undeniably in the public interest to fully integrate conservation uses
into just compensation law in order to encourage the preservation
and creation of wetlands.165 Integrating conservation uses into just
compensation law might actually have a positive effect on the amount
of land conserved in the United States by increasing public awareness
of conservation markets and changing the deeply rooted American
assumption that land is valuable only as developed or as held for
future development. 166 The fact that the government is exercising its
power of eminent domain and taking land that is ecologically
sensitive may seem to make the entire exercise futile; however, this is
not the case. Under the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA"), 6 7 the government itself will have to mitigate any wetlands
it destroys.' 68
The public interest is also served by encouraging conservation
banking. If the environment is to be preserved, credit trading is the
most realistic method of doing so via a method that speaks to
everyone regardless of ideology: money. 169  While command and
control water regulations have brought great water quality gains to
the United States, they have also provoked an anti-environmental
backlash that may prevent the furtherance of environmentalism
through command and control. 170  Wetlands mitigation banking
injects flexibility into the process by allowing industry the opportunity
to be green and have some autonomy in environmental compliance
decisions, while at the same time reducing compliance costs.
165. See Gardner, supra note 4, at 534-35 ("[T]he question today is no longer whether
wetlands should be protected, but rather how best to protect them."). This can be done
through mitigation banks: "Wetland mitigation banking, if properly implemented, can
offer benefits both to the environment and to private landowners." Id. at 550.
166. See id. at 529 (quoting Sir Edmond Coke, "[F]or what is land but the profits
thereof[?]," as support for the argument that Americans fail to see how land left in its
natural state is valuable).
167. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2000).
168. Id. § 4334.
169. Sapp, supra note 105, at 963.
170. See id. at 953; JUDITH A. LAYZER, THE ENVIRONMENTAL CASE: TRANSLATING
VALUES INTO POLICY 369 (2d ed. 2006) ("Many environmentalists have, in fact, been
reassessing the traditional approaches to environmental protection in the 1990s in
response to the backlash those regulations engendered. They have considered a host of
approaches to addressing environmental problems [including] ... incentive-based policies
.. . )
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What is at stake environmentally is incredibly important from
many different vantage points. Wetlands in particular show that
human quality of life is tied to environmental quality, as wetlands
provide flood control, water purification, and critical wildlife and fish
habitat.17 Unfortunately, these functions were not discovered until a
significant amount of the United States' wetlands had already been
destroyed."'
Flood control is a crucial function of wetlands173 which, once lost,
is difficult to regain by traditional methods of human engineering.174
When precipitation reaches a developed surface, such as a parking
lot, the water flows quickly into the nearest stream. The result is that
the water sometimes hits the stream at too great a volume for the
stream's capacity, thus resulting in a flood.17 s However, when
precipitation hits a wetland, the vegetation and structure slow the
water down, delivering it to the stream at the proper rate. 76 Heavily
developed areas often have flood problems that are attributable to
loss of wetlands.1
77
Wetlands can also control floods along the coast.178  Louisiana
formerly had a vast system of wetlands1 79 which, over time, have been
severely damaged by erosion and human activity. 8 ° Many scientists
believe that the natural wetlands would have drastically changed the
171. Andreen, supra note 106, at 583-84.
172. Id. at 584. Estimates of the amount destroyed vary. Id. at 583.
173. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 102, at 695.
174. For example, southern Florida was formerly a self-regulating system: water
flowed from Lake Okeechobee to the Everglades in a sheet and then passed into the Gulf
of Mexico. Years of tinkering have altered the region so that water is diverted from the
Everglades and shoots straight into the ocean from Central Florida. Currently, engineers
are attempting to restore some of the previous functions in order to restore the
Everglades, but the system has so many canals, pumps, and reservoirs that making the
slightest changes to the system is a monumental effort. See, e.g., Kevin Wadlow, C-111
Project Breaks Ground, FLA. KEYS KEYNOTER, Aug. 4, 2007, available at http://www.key
noter.com/articles/2007/08/03/key west-news/newsll.txt.
175. See JOHN NOLT ET AL., WHAT HAVE WE DONE? THE FOUNDATION FOR
GLOBAL SUSTAINABILITY'S STATE OF THE BIOREGION REPORT FOR THE UPPER
TENNESSEE VALLEY AND THE SOUTHERN APPALACHIAN MOUNTAINS 34 (1997).
176. See Andreen, supra note 106, at 584 ("Wetlands... serve to improve water quality
by removing nutrients and trapping sediments before they flow into open waters. In
addition, wetlands provide flood protection by serving as storage basins during high water
.... and help to even out stream flows.").
177. See NOLT ET AL., supra note 175, at 201, 203.
178. Andreen, supra note 106, at 584.
179. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 102, at 695.
180. Brad Heath, Levees Not Enough on Louisiana's Vanishing Coast; Plans Try to
Halt Damage from Loss of Marshes, Isles, USA TODAY, Feb. 21,2007, at A4.
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outcome of Hurricane Katrina in 2005.8 Wetlands would have
slowed the storm surge, decreasing pressure on the levees and,
perhaps, ultimately preventing the levee breech that caused
substantial loss of life and property."8
Wetlands also serve water purification functions by removing
sediments, toxins, and bacteria from water runoff.183 When the rate of
water flow is slowed in the wetland, sediments fall out."8 This is
important because sedimentation is a major water quality problem in
the United States.185 It affects fish reproduction by decreasing aquatic
life's ability to find mates, and it affects the eggs' ability to absorb the
proper amount of oxygen from the water even when there is
successful mating. 6
In addition, nitrogen and phosphorus in the sediment can lead to
algal blooms.187 Algal blooms are a concern because they starve out
other organisms for oxygen, resulting in fish kills.188 The proper
balance of plant life is important in wetlands because wetlands
provide crucial spawning grounds for fish and habitat for migratory
birds that use the dense vegetation to hide from predators.189 This
vegetation is also the basis of many food chains. 19°
In sum, courts have many good reasons to consider wetlands
mitigation banking as the highest and best use in cases where land can
be preserved as wetland or where entrepreneurs can create wetlands
on the site. First, the Olson standard should apply.19' Wetlands
mitigation banking is a well-developed market, not a speculative
enterprise; consequently, disallowing this conservation method as a
highest and best use deprives landowners of due process. 19, Second,
181. See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 102, at 695.
182. See Heath, supra note 180.
183. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 102, at 695; see David P. Hutchinson, A Setback for
the Rivers of Massachusetts? An Application of Regulatory Takings Doctrine to the
Watershed Protection Act and the Massachusetts River Protection Act, 73 B.U. L. REV. 237,
241-42 (1993).
184. Andreen, supra note 106, at 584.
185. Id. at 558. Runoff from farms, logging, and developed areas contribute to the
problem. Hutchinson, supra note 183, at 239.
186. Andreen, supra note 106, at 558.
187. Id. at 556.
188. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, HYPOXIA & WETLAND RESTORATION 1,
http://www.epa.gov/owow/wetlands/facts/hypoxia-pr.pdf.
189. Andreen, supra note 106, at 583-84.
190. Id.
191. See supra Part I.B.
192. See 1A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN 2007, supra note 25, § 4.8 (stating that
due process is violated whenever just compensation is not given).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
courts should rule in the public interest which includes conserving and
creating wetlands.193
B. Endangered Species Act Mitigation Credits
The ESA also provides opportunities to value land based on its
conservation uses, though not through as well-developed of a system
as that which exists for wetlands. The ESA empowers the U.S.
Secretary of Commerce to identify species at risk for extinction and
subsequently classify them as either endangered or threatened. 194
Species extinction is a concern not only for the loss of the intrinsic
worth of the species, but because the loss of the species may upset the
balance of an entire ecosystem, triggering abnormal decreases of
some species populations and increases of others. 195 In order to
protect the species, regulations must reach into private land because
many endangered or threatened species' habitat includes private land,
and fifty percent of the listed species' habitat consists solely of private
land.' 96 Destroying, or "taking," an endangered species is illegal, and
landowners with endangered or threatened species found on their
land face strict regulations. 9 7 Protecting these species, therefore, has
a high political cost and rate of resistance by landowners.98
Protection of habitat is crucial to protecting endangered or
threatened species. In order to protect habitat, communities have
been developing novel ways to enforce the ESA while allowing
flexibility to accommodate community economic needs.' 99
Landowners can apply to the Department of Interior to undertake
activities which "take" an endangered species on their land.2°° If a
permit is granted, then the taking is done in conjunction with a
193. Gardner, supra note 4, at 587.
194. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2)(A) (2000).
195. NoLT ET AL., supra note 175, at 75-76 ("I have watched the face of many a newly
wolfless mountain, and seen the south-facing slopes wrinkle with a maze of new deer trails.
I have seen every edible bush and seedling browsed .... I now suspect that just as a deer
herd lives in mortal fear of its wolves, so does a mountain live in mortal fear of its deer."
(quoting Aldo Leopold)).
196. Clark & Downes, supra note 9, at 10.
197. See id. at 48-49.
198. See generally Sapp, supra note 105, at 953 (stating that many American
landowners resist the regulation of their land regardless of the purpose behind the
regulation).
199. Clark & Downes, supra note 9, at 47-49 (observing that the "strict requirements"
of the ESA have caused developers to be willing to negotiate habitat protection in
conjunction with their projects and that market incentive programs often play a role in the
negotiations).
200. 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2000).
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Habitat Conservation Plan ("HCP"). 10 HCPs lay out the scope of the
impact of a taking, the alternatives to a taking, why those alternatives
are not being used, and what the permit applicant will do to mitigate
their actions.
2°
Two early market-based alternatives are already established in
the HCP system: Tradable Development Rights ("TDRs") and the
Habitat Transaction Method ("HTM"). 23 TDRs have been used in
areas where conservation and development interact, such as the New
Jersey Pinelands.2 °4  Development rights are distributed to
landowners within a zone like the Pinelands and can be sold if the
landowner agrees to maintain the land in its natural state.0 5 In
addition, TDRs funnel development into areas that are better suited
for development by classifying the types of land that may be
developed. 2° For example, in the Chattahoochee Hill Country near
Atlanta, Georgia, the land has been divided into "sending" and
"receiving" zones.0 7 Receiving zones are planned communities
where development will occur.2 8 Sending zones are spaces in which
regulators attempt to limit development and maintain the land in its
natural state.209 Basically, developers are allowed to develop land in a
receiving zone once they have purchased comparable TDRs from a
landowner in a sending zone.210 Once a developer has purchased the
TDR from a sending zone, the TDR is permanently retired and no
one will be able to develop that land.21 In the Chattahoochee Hill
Country, a nonprofit group has undertaken the effort to divide land
into sending and receiving zones and serve as the land "bank,"
matching developers with landowners who wish to permanently
preserve their land in its natural state.2 2
The HTM is similar to TDRs; however, instead of valuing all
acres of land within a protected zone as biologically equal, HTM
values acres based on the actual presence of an endangered species
201. 50 C.F.R. § 17.22 (2006).
202. § 17.22(b)(1)(iii).
203. Clark & Downes, supra note 9, at 50.
204. Id. at 53.
205. Id. at 54 (stating that credits are maintained in a centralized bank for the specified
area).
206. Id. at 53-54.
207. Larry Copeland, Banking Against Urban Sprawl; Landowners Outside Atlanta
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on the land.213 The HTM approach also has fewer restrictions on
where development may occur; instead, HTM relies on mitigation
ratios that provide economic incentives to steer development into less
sensitive areas.214
In 2003, the FWS began a system to facilitate the trading of ESA
credits. 15 Under this system, credits are traded within areas which
are biologically important to an endangered or threatened species.216
In order to create a credit, the landowner must show that the land is
actually helping to conserve the species. 217  The Katoomba Group
roughly estimates that 930 transactions of habitat credits have taken
place, constituting a market volume of $40,773,590.218
ESA systems for earning credits are not as highly developed as
are the systems for earning wetland mitigation credits. However, the
argument that ESA credits should be considered a highest and best
use is parallel to the argument that wetland mitigation credits should
be considered as such. ESA credits are a profitable use that
landowners can make of their land.219 This opportunity is currently
available to landowners who have an endangered species on their
213. Clark & Downes, supra note 9, at 54-55 (contrasting the HTM method with the
TDR method of valuing land based on the likelihood that a piece of property could
provide habitat for a species).
214. Id. at 55.
215. Guidance for the Establishment, Use and Operation of Conservation Banks, 68
Fed. Reg. 24,753, 24,753 (May 8, 2003); see also PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT, supra note
118, at 1 (establishing a cooperative arrangement between the United States Department
of Agriculture, the Natural Resources Conservation Service, and the FWS to foster habitat
credit trading markets in the United States).
216. See The Katoomba Group's Ecosystem Marketplace, Backgrounder: U.S.
Conservation Banking, http://ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/marketwatch.background
er.php?market id=l&is-aggregate=0 (last visited Nov. 7, 2007) (detailing the types of
units traded); Memorandum from the Dir. of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Serv. to the Reg'l
Dirs., Regions 1-7, and Manager, Cal. Nev. Operations, Guidance for the Establishment,
Use and Operation of Conservation Banks 6 (May 2, 2003) [hereinafter Conservation
Banks Memo].
217. See Conservation Banks Memo, supra note 216, at 6 (stating that conservation
banks will only be allowed on a case-by-case basis as determined by the Director of the
FWS).
218. The Katoomba Group's Ecosystem Marketplace, Overview: U.S. Conservation
Banking, http://ecosystemmarketplace.com/pages/marketwatch.overview.transaction.php?
marketid=1 (last visited Nov. 7, 2007) [hereinafter Overview: U.S. Conservation
Banking].
219. Environmental Defense, Red-Cockaded Woodpecker Conservation Bank,
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/article.cfm?contentid=2664 (last visited Nov. 7,
2007); Copeland, supra note 207; Overview: U.S. Conservation Banking, supra note 218.
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land or who live in areas undergoing intense development.2 ° One of
the best examples of a landowner profiting from such an arrangement
is International Paper, who earns and then sells credits for protecting
red-cockaded woodpeckers.
Of course, because the market for ESA credits is not as well
developed as the market for wetland mitigation credits, there are
some legitimate arguments that the use is too speculative to meet the
Olson standard. It is unknown how many landowners could actually
profit from the system. It is also unknown whether landowners will
have to prove the presence of the endangered species on their land
before establishing eligibility for participation in all credit systems.222
Further, because it appears that the FWS is not using a uniform
system across the country, it may be difficult for practitioners to
predict which method would be used with a certain piece of land that
is being taken.223 In some cases, like the Chattahoochee Hill Country,
nonprofit groups are taking the initiative and trading development
rights as credits.24 Therefore, it would be especially difficult to argue
to a court about the potential value of land as if used to earn and sell
credits unless the FWS had already implemented an HCP in the area.
The fact that landowners who have endangered species on their
property face strict regulations does not moot the possibility that
credits are the highest and best use.225 It is true that once the FWS
realizes that an endangered species exists on the property, the
traditional market value of the land will decrease because the land
220. Copeland, supra note 207; Clark & Downes, supra note 9, at 50-56 (establishing
that through TDRs and HTM, landowners can receive payments in exchange for a
promise not to develop their land).
221. Environmental Defense, Red-Cockaded Woodpecker Conservation Bank,
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/article.cfm?contentid=2664 (last visited Nov. 7,
2007).
222. In an area using HTM, land is classified by biological value of the habitat,
including whether the endangered species is actually on the property. Clark & Downes,
supra note 9, at 54-55. TDRs use more subjective criteria, for example interviewing
residents to learn about the traditional uses of the land and protecting areas of currently
undeveloped land while pushing growth into central areas. Id. at 53-54.
223. See Clark & Downes, supra note 9, at 48-56 (outlining two different credit systems
that the FWS uses without explaining why different methods were chosen for different
communities); Preparation of an Environmentai Impact Statement in Anticipation of
Receiving a Permit Application to Incidentally Take Threatened and Endangered Species
in Association with the Kern County Valley Floor Habitat Conservation Plan for Kern
County, California, 62 Fed. Reg. 55,269, 55,270 (Oct. 23, 1997) (stating that HTM is an
option for Kern County, California, but not explaining why it was chosen over TDRs).
224. Copeland, supra note 207.
225. See Conservation Banks Memo, supra note 216, at 1 (discussing why conservation
banking is an attractive conservation method).
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cannot be developed without a permit.226 However, the landowner is
free to voluntarily conserve the land in order to create credits to
sell.227 And, at an average of over $43,000 per transaction, this value
may be the best deal the landowner would get anyway.228
ESA credits have the potential to develop just as wetland
mitigation credits have developed over the last two decades.229 In
locations where an HCP is in place, counsel will have more
information with which to appraise value.20  At a minimum, judges
should continue to consider arguments that this is a proper appraisal
method as the laws, regulations, and market conditions continue to
develop. If ESA credits are not currently an appropriate factor in
appraisal under the Olson standard, they may become one as the
market develops.231
CONCLUSION
Current markets value land that is dedicated to conservation.
Landowners may choose to create a wetland or endangered species
habitat or to permanently retire their land in its natural state for a
profit.232 Given that there is a well-established market nationwide for
wetlands mitigation banking and locally for endangered species
habitat, courts, practitioners, and appraisers should take conservation
uses into account when assigning the highest and best use of a parcel
of land. Doing so is required under the Olson standard, because use
of lands for conservation purposes is a reasonable future use of
qualified parcels. 33
226. See Clark & Downes, supra note 9, at 49-50 (noting that once an endangered
species is discovered on a land, the animal's presence has the potential to halt projects,
and explaining that the law requires landowners to refrain from disturbing habitat in any
way without a permit and that the permit process is "slow, laborious and contentious").
227. See id.
228. See Overview: U.S. Conservation Banking, supra note 218 (dividing market
volume by transaction volume to get the dollar amount per transaction).
229. See Clark & Downes, supra note 9, at 47 ("Conservationists, government agencies,
and businesses are beginning to explore ways to utilize market mechanisms as economic
incentives for achieving conservation goals."); supra Part IVA.
230. An HCP sets out whether a trading system will be used and, if so, which system.
See Clark & Downes, supra note 9, at 50 (noting that while many HCPs do not incorporate
a market-based incentive, some do incorporate incentives such as HTM and TDRs).
231. See Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
232. See supra notes 143-44, 209-11 and accompanying text.
233. See supra Part I.C.
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When approaching cases like Loveladies or Formanek,2 4 courts
should rely on appraisers to determine if land is suitable for
conservation easements or for conversion to environmental credits. If
parties can establish that trading of conservation credits is occurring
in their geographical region in a manner that is suitable to their
property, then courts should consider this use in order to be
consistent with Olson.
In conclusion, environmental resources are precious assets which
the government has sought to protect through laws like the Clean
Water Act and the Endangered Species Act. Part of this protection
should include full integration of the concepts of mitigation banking
into just compensation law. Doing so would achieve proper
application of the Olson standard and would advance a substantial
public interest. Takings law is, at this point, only partially integrated
with mitigation banking.235 The Olson standard provides a means for
further integration. Because conservation markets are adequately
developed to meet the Olson test, courts should recognize that these
uses are not speculative and may legitimately represent the highest
and best use of the land.
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